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Abstact 
This paper investigates the ontology and epistemological justification behind investment 
benchmarks through the lens of a logical positivist paradigm.  This is relevant because the field of 
finance is often critiqued by moral philosophers and has to justify itself as having a philosophical 
basis.  It is introduced with a Greek ɷɸʀʃʆʐʅɿ thought experiment on the social good of such 
benchmarks. This is done to draw the reader into a mindset that questions their epistemological 
underpinning. It asks what the nature of benchmarks is and answers this within the context of the 
broad academic finance tradition that is dominated by positivists, empiricists and a few critical 
realists.   
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 Salviati: ͞If we see a stockmarket benchmark index that goes up, it is clear that invested wealth in 
aggregate is increasing. Do you not agree with me? ? 
Simplicio: ͞Yes, that is obvious. ? 
Salviati: ͞If that is true, then the stockmarket benchmark has a social good; but the stockmarket 
benchmark index can also go down; an effect which is contrary to your supposition. Do you therefore 
see that from your assumption that the stockmarket benchmark index has a social good, I can infer 
that it does not? ?   
Salviati and Simplicio were fictional men created by Galieo (1632).  In their dialogue Simplicio 
suggests numbers are "trifles which later spread among the vulgar". As the introductory improvised 
dialogue between Salviati and Simplicio illustrates, investment benchmarks are important to both 
academics and practitioners. They measure wealth creation and destruction. Despite the widespread 
practice of benchmarking, Yasin (2002) points out there is no unifying theory.   
 
An introduction to benchmarks can be found in Conover, et al., (2013). Ontologically, their objective 
reality is the starting point of the investment process and they are used for measurement and 
attribution at the end point. This determines the epistemology and method used in their 
construction.  The dictionary defines them as representing  ?ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝǌĞĚƚŽŽůƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚ
ĂƐĂƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?. In this respect, they must be well defined and built according to transparent 
and replicable rules. Stock market indexes are the most widely recognized investment benchmarks. 
 
The objective of investment benchmarking is twofold. The first is as a proxy for an asset class return 
and second to decide how to allocate investments among broad asset classes. There is extensive 
literature on what makes benchmarks valid and how to choose them (see Lehmann and Modest 
(1987)).  In this respect, the construction of such benchmarks is a process based on reliable empirical 
method.  A summary of this method is provided by Kat, et al., (2001). It is based on positive 
theorizing and is a statement of  ?what is ?. The process is not based on  ?value judgement ?, 
benchmarks are designed to explain and measure investment outcomes.  With this in mind, 
academic usage of investment benchmarks that fall within the logical positivist paradigm can prove 
useful to establish theory from best practice.  In this respect, the aim of this paper is to clarify the 
nature of benchmark time series and not to attempt to answer unanswerable questions.  
Schlick (1936) was the father of logical positivism.  This school of thought was developed by a loose 
gathering of philosophers called the Vienna Circle.  Its philosophical tradition emphasises 
observation and reason as the basis of understanding.  Despite this foundation, the roots of modern 
finance and positivism can be traced back to the British empiricists. Investment benchmarks are, 
however, not considered part of the empiricist tradition as they are simply a financial tool from 
which it is possible to derive verifiable empirical evidence.  The treatment of the mathematical 
returns generated by financial assets can be very methodical and sometimes fall into the realm of 
logic, hence its appendage to the positivist label. 
In a practical sense, investment benchmarks demand a philosophical realism in respect of the 
treatment of the time series of investment returns. Research into them must therefore be objective.  
It is, as a consequence, widely accepted that investment portfolios require benchmarks that can 
measure and attribute performance.  In a Platonist world view, they have an independent objective 
existence. It is the reliance on logic that gives some mathematical comfort ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ďĞŶĐŚŵĂƌŬ ?Ɛ
output. Financial academics can therefore use benchmarks in their research whilst noting Morgan, et 
Ăů ?Ɛ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? observation that their use is directly linked to assumptions about ontology, 
epistemology, and human nature.  
Logical positivism and its close sibling logical empiricism, use tautology and observations from 
experience.  It dismisses the normative pretensions of many of the philosophical traditions. In this 
sense the grounding of benchmark usage in a logical positivist paradigm exposes them to ethical 
critique.  They have the failing that their underlying attribution of value and the use of time series in 
their construct do not allow for moral judgments.  
The Vienna Circle did not devote much attention to ethics. Indeed, Schlick (1936) claimed that ethics 
was just a descriptive terminology and thereby effectively dismissed the debate.  Aside from this, the 
biggest issue with claiming benchmarks are grounded in logical positivism is that they in themselves 
do not measure anything.  They are, after all, simply a measurement tool.  That said, those that do 
construct them do so for a measurement reason and the philosophical backbone of logical positivism 
refers to their usage. 
As a result of ƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛphilosophical realism, the use of benchmarks use in 
performance evaluation means that precision and accuracy are necessary.  They are often built on 
the back of a tradition of finance termed Modern Portfolio Theory first postulated by Markowitz, 
(1968). There is a well-developed body of knowledge on benchmark usage that stems from this. The 
theory is considered a confirmed hypothesis despite a number of critiques. Kuhn (2012) would have 
observed that it is believed despite mounting evidence against it. It builds on the economic concept 
of perfect markets were in effect theorised through Platonic abstraction. The market benchmark 
proxy that is derived from it is based on the assumption that all stocks in an investment universe are 
represented. This is a concept that Carnap (1928) would have found familiar.  
In the logical positivist paradigm knowledge can be obtained by observation and experiment. As 
such, the scientific method employed in benchmark construction forms the basis of the knowledge 
behind their use. This means the concepts of determinism, empiricism, and generality all play a part. 
In benchmarking, the investment universe has quantities that are never exact, that require 
measurement and through which that patterns can be observed. As a result, academic research into 
the latter is required in order to ensure that benchmarks are optimal.  This requires an Aristotelian 
approach to observation and categorization. 
Despite their foundations, benchmarks are not underpinned by philosophical certainty.  It still not 
known what is the most appropriate benchmark for each and every asset class.  There remains, 
therefore, an academic question that can be addressed using logical deduction based on the 
theorised mathematical relationship between risk and return. The random and representative 
sampling that is required for a benchmarks construction may help develop deductive research, but 
that sampling can be pre-disposed to miss important elements of the investment universe.  
Understanding the philosophical underpinning is important because benchmarks have many uses. 
These can be found in Bailey, et al., (1990).   In a dualist sense, they provide the framework for 
analysis. Not only do benchmarks help measure and attribute, but as Siegel (2003) wrote, they 
 ?determine the performance of investment managers perhaƉƐ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ĂŶǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ?
Investors need to know the nature of the risk that their portfolios incorporate. This allows them to 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝƚƐ ?relative risk ?ĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĂƌĞŝƚǁŝƚŚ ?expected return ? and communicate expectations 
in respect of how assets will be invested.  In this way, benchmarks provide accountability. 
Benchmark enquiry through a logical positivist lens obscures the role they play in communication, an 
important human element which philosophy has spent many millennia exploring.  The knowledge 
they impart may be non-inferential but clearly benchmarks do possess authority.  In order to 
understand benchmarks it is useful to understand investor expectations.  In a philosophical way, 
investment outcomes relative to a benchmark can be seen to be based on the tenants of the 
empirical position.  These are often framed in finance in terms of asset classes and the return time 
series that they generate.   
Individual agents in the stock market are heuristic, they enjoy free will.  That said, the positivistic 
paradigm is criticized due to its lack of regard for the subjective states of individuals. In this respect, 
the theory behind optimal benchmarks can be critiqued for assuming investors are rational. A 
benchmark that incorporates group decisions partially addresses this such as peer group 
benchmarks typical of those used by Jagannathan, et al., (2010).  According to the critics of this 
paradigm, objectivity needs to be replaced by subjectivity in the process of scientific inquiry. This 
gave rise to anti-positivism or naturalistic inquiry. 
In the practical world, there is more than one asset class. As a consequence there is the need for 
different benchmarks to address them.  A degree of philosophical pragmatism is involved in 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? choice of benchmarks.  It is assumed that it is appropriate if it works satisfactorily.  
Academics, however, are more focused on a benchmarks ability to identify the skill those 
practitioners have. There are also different securities and sub-groupings within each asset class.   
In the way that Salviati challenged Simplicio, one should critically reflect whether an index is the best 
benchmark at this granular level, its construction rules, security selection and weights.  In order to 
address the positive critique, it is worth considering the extent to which a benchmark can be truly 
objective and to what extent it is conditioned by the construction method. In constructing a 
benchmark from scrĂƚĐŚ ?ŽŶĞĐŽƵůĚĂƉƉůǇƚŚĞ ?dĂďƵla RŽƐĂ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ proposed by Locke (1841).  It 
does not suffer the scepticism that arises from impression and recollection.  
Siegel (2003) suggested that benchmarks have a triple role.  These are as benchmarks for actively 
managed funds, as proxies for asset classes and as templates for passive funds. The majority of these 
investment benchmarks are chosen by an indirect process.  As a result of this, they are assuming a 
causal relationship that might not be appropriate.  The benchmark that managers apply have 
typically been constructed using abduction.  Applying KĐĐĂŵ ?Ɛ razor described in Domingos (1999), 
finance scholars have adopted the market proxy that is derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
as the default benchmark.  In philosophical terms, it is not a technical problem of identifying a law of 
behaviour.  Other benchmarks use heuristics as a performance guide.  These do not allow for a 
detailed attribution of performance.  The positivist paradigm suggests investment benchmarks 
should allow for consistency and for benchmarks to be replicated. In order to identify this, one 
needs to have a degree of academic consistency with the aforementioned Modern Portfolio Theory.  
It should be pointed out that positivism is sometimes mistakenly linked to empiricism but this is not 
ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?KŶĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ĂůůƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŽŶĞŵƵƐƚƵƐĞĂŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ
construct and index.  In a logical positivist context, benchmarks require operational and analytical 
defferentia specifica.  Typically, some sort of ostensive classification takes place, such as by sector or 
industry.  The usefulness of taking a positivist approach is that it allows benchmarks to be 
predictable and controllable. In finance, the central limit theorem suggests that the return time 
series have a normal distribution.  In reality, this is not the case.   
Another critique of the positivist approach to benchmarking is the shortcomings of induction.  The 
outliers of investment performance are the ones that impact the investment benchmark averages 
the most.  Mathematical induction, meanwhile, is independent of the process.  That said, as the 
whole universe of investments are known, the critique can be addressed.  Despite this, its empirical 
epistemology is often rejected by philosophers who argue that knowledge cant be derived from its 
purely numerical output.  However using Popper ?Ɛ (2005) stance it is possible to overcome this. In a 
hypothetico-deductive world, one can construct an optimal benchmark provided a hypothesis can be 
tested based on trying to reject the null hypothesis that the alternative can deliver a better risk 
adjusted investment return.    
In essence this paper was a thought piece about the nature of benchmarks.  Salviati, who was 
introduced to illustrate the issue of whether benchmarks have a social good, would have concluded 
they are a market phenomenon and as such ultimately dependent on a time series created by 
human interaction. They are, after all, created empirically.  Despite the critiques as to the validity of 
many of the basic assumptions, benchmarks do help with quantification and measurement. The 
ontology and epistemological justification for them lies firmly within the logical positive paradigm.  
They are therefore useful in empirical method and this forms the basis of scientific enquiry in 
finance.   
  
Bibliography 
Bailey, J., Richards, T. M., & Tierney., D. E. (1990). Benchmark Portfolios: Concept and Design. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
Carnap, R. (1928). Der logische aufbau der welt. 
Conover, C., Broby, D., & Cariño, D. (2013). Introduction to Benchmarks. CIPM Reading: CFA Institute. 
Domingos, P. (1999). The role of Occam's razor in knowledge discovery.,. 3(4), pp.409-425. 
Galieo, G. (1995. 1632.). Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo, Giornata seconda.i,. 
Landini, Fiorenza/Firenze/Florence, and Guerner. 
Jagannathan, R., Malakhov, A., & Novikov, D. (2010). Do hot hands exist among hedge fund 
managers? An empirical evaluation. . The Journal of Finance, , 65(1), pp.217-255. 
Kat, H., & Brooks, S. (2001). The statistical properties of hedge fund index returns and their 
implications for investors. . london: Cass Business School Research Paper. 
Kuhn, T. (2012). The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago press. 
Lehmann, B., & Modest, D. (1987). Mutual fund performance evaluation: A comparison of 
benchmarks and benchmark comparisons. The journal of finance, 42(2), pp.233-265. 
Locke, J. (1841). An essay concerning human understanding. 
Markowitz, H. (1968). Portfolio selection: efficient diversification of investments (Vol. 16). Yale 
university press. 
Morgan, G., & Smircich, L. (1980). The case for qualitative research. . (5(4), pp.491-500.). 
Popper, K. (2005). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge. 
Schlick, M. (1936). Meaning and verification. . (45(4), pp.339-369.). 
Siegel, L. (2003). Benchmarks and Investment Management. Research Foundation of CFA Institute. 
Charlottesville, VA: CFA Institute. 
Yasin, M. (2002). The theory and practice of benchmarking: then and now. Benchmarking: An 
International Journal, 9(3), pp.217-243. 
 
 
